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PAMELA R. FERGUSON*
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND ITS ROLE IN
THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
ABSTRACT. Many international instruments proclaim that those who face crimi-
nal prosecution ought to be aﬀorded a ‘presumption of innocence’, and the impor-
tance and central role of this presumption is recognized by legal systems throughout
the world. There is, however, little agreement about its meaning and extent of
application. This article considers the purposes of legal presumptions in general and
explores various, sometimes contradictory, conceptions of this most famous one. It is
equated by many scholars to the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. As such, it is merely a rule of evidence (albeit an important one),
with no application pre- or post-trial. The article advocates adoption of a broader,
normative approach, namely that the presumption reﬂects the relationship which
ought to exist between citizen and State when a citizen is suspected of breaching the
criminal law. As such, it should be promoted as a practical attitude to be adopted by
the key protagonists in the justice system, for the duration of the criminal process.
I INTRODUCTION
In August 2014 the Mayor of London suggested that UK criminal
law be amended to deal with the dangers posed by the jihadist group
‘Islamic State’ (ISIS). In relation to British citizens who travel to
certain ‘war areas’ such as Syria and Iraq: ‘The law needs a swift and
minor change so that there is a ‘‘rebuttable presumption’’ that all
those visiting war areas without notifying the [UK] authorities have
done so for a terrorist purpose.’1 In response to such calls for a
‘presumption of guilt’, recourse is often had to the rhetoric of the
‘presumption of innocence’, yet there is rarely any attempt to artic-
ulate what this means, or why such a presumption should operate
* Professor of Scots Law at University of Dundee, Scotland, UK. E-mail:
p.r.ferguson@dundee.ac.uk.
1 B. Johnston, ‘Do nothing, and we invite the tide of terror to our front door’ The
Telegraph, 24 August 2014.
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even in cases in which there is very strong evidence of guilt. This
article explores the purposes of legal presumptions in general, and
assesses various, often contradictory, conceptions of this most fa-
mous one. It is often treated as a rule of evidence, synonymous with
the burden of proof being on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and therefore having no application beyond the
trial itself. The article advocates a broader, normative approach,
namely that the presumption reﬂects the relationship which ought to
exist between citizen and State when a citizen is suspected of
breaching the criminal law. It proposes that the presumption of
innocence be promoted as a ‘practical attitude’: a mind-set which
determines conduct.2 This practical attitude should be adopted by the
key protagonists in the justice system, for the duration of the criminal
process.
II THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESUMPTION
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that
‘everyone charged with a criminal oﬀence shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law’.3 Similar guarantees are found
in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,4 and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5 Although not speciﬁcally stated in
the US Constitution, the presumption has been held to be implied by
the 5th, 6th and 14th amendments.6 It is not conﬁned to Western
European and Anglo-American legal systems; a version appears in
such diverse instruments as the Brazilian,7 Columbian,8 Iranian,9
2 As coined by Antony Duﬀ: R.A. Duﬀ, ‘Presuming Innocence’ in L. Zedner and
J.V. Roberts (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice:
Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 52.
3 ECHR, art 6(2).
4 Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948, art 11(1).
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, s 11(d).
6 Coﬃn v US 156 U S 432 (1895). For a history of the presumption in the USA, see
J.N. Sorrentino, ‘Demystifying the Presumption of Innocence’ (1996) 15 Glendale
Law Review 16–26.
7 Brazilian Constitution 1988, art 5.
8 Political Constitution of Columbia 1991, art 29.
9 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979, art 37.
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Russian10 and South African11 constitutions. The presumption has
been referred to as ‘a human right’,12 ‘the undoubted law, axiomatic
and elementary’,13 and a ‘fundamental principle of procedural fair-
ness in the criminal law’.14 Despite this international recognition,
there is little agreement about its meaning, or extent of application.15
III THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND THE
BURDEN OF PROOF
It is common for emphasis to be given to the presumption’s instru-
mental value, that is, to its role in securing the ‘right result’ by pro-
tecting against wrongful conviction.16 There is, however, little
articulation of how it does this. One suggestion is that it is a mech-
anism for ensuring that illegitimate factors such as non-co-operation
with the police investigation, the decision not to testify at the trial, or
even the fact that the accused is facing a criminal trial, are not slipped
into the scales of evidence on the side of the prosecution.17 Its most
10 Constitution of the Russia Federation 1993, art 49.
11 Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s
35(3)(h).
12 H.L. Ho, ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’ in P. Roberts and
J. Hunter, Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Proce-
dural Traditions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 259, 259 n 1.
13 Coﬃn v US (n 6 above) 453.
14 A. Ashworth and J. Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 71.
15 Many scholars have pointed out this lack of clarity: J. Thaler, ‘Punishing the
Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to
Trial’ (1978) Wisconsin Law Review 441, 459 and 460; P.J. Schwikkard, ‘The Pre-
sumption of Innocence: What Is It?’ (1998) 11 South African Journal of Criminal
Justice 396, 396; T. Weigend, ‘There is Only One Presumption of Innocence’ (2013)
42 Netherland Journal of Legal Philosophy 193, 193; C. Stuckenberg, ‘Who is Pre-
sumed Innocent of What by Whom?’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 301.
16 N 14 above, 71. A similar point is made in relation to US law in J.G. Pickett,
‘The Presumption of Innocence Imperilled: The New Federal Rules of Evidence and
the Use of other Sexual-Oﬀense Evidence in Washington’ (1995) 70Washington Law
Review 883, 899.
17 In Taylor v Kentucky 436 U S 478, 485 (1978) the US Supreme Court stated that
the presumption ‘cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion
that arises from the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their
conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced’. See also R.D. Friedman, ‘A
Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds’ (1999–2000) 52 Stanford Law Review
873, 880.
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famous expression in English law is from the case of Woolmington v
DPP18 in 1935. The trial judge had directed the jury that where the
prosecution had established that someone had died due to the ac-
cused’s acts, this was presumed to be murder unless the accused could
satisfy the jury that the death was manslaughter, an accidental killing
or justiﬁable homicide.19 This was held on appeal to be a misdirec-
tion, and Viscount Sankey’s dictum, giving the decision of the House
of Lords, has been often quoted: ‘Throughout the web of the English
Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the
duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt …’.20 Although
Woolmington is often treated as being a resounding endorsement of
the presumption, it actually focused more on the burden of proof,
and the two have often been treated as synonymous.21 The US22 and
UK23 Supreme Courts have each equated the two. Treating the
presumption as merely another way of articulating the burden of
18 [1935] AC 462. For an appreciation of the case see J.C. Smith, ‘The Presump-
tion of Innocence’ (1987) 38 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 223, 224: ‘Never… has
the House of Lords done more noble a deed in the ﬁeld of criminal law than on that
day’. Reservations about Lord Sankey’s dicta have, however, been expressed by
Ashworth in ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 International
Journal of Evidence & Proof 241, 245.
19 [1935] AC 462, 472.
20 Ibid., 481–482.
21 See, for example, A.N. Brown, Criminal Evidence and Procedure: An Intro-
duction (London: Bloomsbury, 2010): ‘The accused does not have to explain any-
thing at all, ever, unless the prosecution case is suﬃcient in itself to justify a
conviction. This is the meaning of the presumption of innocence…’ (emphasis added).
See also F. Picinali, ‘Innocence and Burdens of Proof in English Criminal Law’
(2014) 13: 4 Law, Probability and Risk 243; and B. Rea, ‘The Presumption of
Innocence in Criminal Cases’ (1941–1942) 3 Washington & Lee Law Review 82, 84.
The latter concludes: ‘In truth then, the presumption of innocence has no indepen-
dent signiﬁcance. The rule that the accused is presumed to be innocent is synony-
mous with the rule that the prosecution has the burden of proof.’
22 See Bell v Wolﬁsh 441 US 520, 533 (1979), per Mr Justice Rehnquist: ‘The
presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal
trials.’
23 See Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264, 292–293 per Lord Bingham ‘…the
underlying rationale of the presumption in domestic law and in the [European]
Convention is an essentially simple one: that it is repugnant to ordinary notions of
fairness for a prosecutor to accuse a defendant of crime and for the defendant to be
then required to disprove the accusation on pain of conviction and punishment if he
fails to do so.’
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proof has led to a focus on whether ‘reverse onus’ provisions, which
require the accused to prove a defence, breach the presumption.24
I advocate an alternative approach: the presumption and the onus
of proof are not synonymous. Further, in contrast to the generally
accepted view that the presumption has no application beyond the
trial itself,25 I suggest that we should treat it as permeating the entire
criminal process. The implications of this are considered further,
below. Prior to describing this alternative approach, however, we
must consider what it means to label something as a ‘legal pre-
sumption’, and how such presumptions operate in practice. We must
also consider the nature of the ‘innocence’ which lies at the heart of
the presumption of innocence.
IV THE NATURE OF LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS
Diﬀerent sorts of presumptions are employed by the law. There are
‘irrebuttable ones’, and ‘rebuttable ones’, but the former may be said
to operate as legal rules rather than as presumptions since no evi-
dence can be led to challenge them. We can also draw a distinction
between ‘derivative’ and ‘foundational’ presumptions. Where
derivative presumptions apply, given proof of a fact ‘P’, a court may
(or sometimes must) presume ‘Q’; the rule warrants the drawing of
‘Q’ as a conclusion from ‘P’ even if, without that rule, ‘P’ would not
suﬃce to prove ‘Q’. With foundational presumptions, in contrast, ‘Q’
is rather a proposition that a court must initially accept, without any
basis for ‘Q’ requiring to be proved in court.26 Presumptions where,
on proof of certain facts, a court must draw a particular inference
have been described as ‘compelling’ presumptions, with those in
which the court may infer the fact in issue being classed as ‘provi-
24 See, for example, Duﬀ (n 2 above); I. Dennis, ‘Reverse Onuses and the Pre-
sumption of Innocence: In Search of Principle’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 901; A.
Gray, ‘Constitutionally Protecting the Presumption of Innocence’ (2012) 31
University of Tasmania Law Review 132; R. Shiner, ‘Corporations and the Pre-
sumption of Innocence’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 485.
25 See, for example, A. Stumer, The Presumption of Innocence (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2010): he notes that the presumption could be viewed as requiring the
accused to be treated as if innocent throughout the criminal process, but calls this
approach a ‘vaporous euphemism for fairness’ and limits his assessment of the
presumption to its relationship with the burden and standard of proof (at xxxviii).
Stumer is quoting P. Healy, ‘Proof and Policy: No Golden Thread’ (1987) Criminal
Law Review 355, 365.
26 I am indebted to Antony Duﬀ for clarifying these distinctions.
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sional presumptions’.27 Many legal presumptions are therefore just
devices used by courts to ‘speed up the process of proof’.28
Two common presumptions which operate in Anglo-American
legal systems include the presumption that children younger than a
certain age lack criminal responsibility, and that a defendant was
‘sane’/of sound mind at the time of the alleged oﬀence(s). In relation
to the former, the relevant English legislation states: ‘It shall be
conclusively presumed that no child under the age of 10 years can be
guilty of any oﬀence’,29 thereby creating an irrebuttable/deriva-
tive/compelling presumption: once it is proved that a child is aged
nine or under, a court must conclude that there is no criminal
responsibility. It may be said that this is not really a presumption at
all, but a conclusion. By contrast, the presumption of sanity is clearly
a foundational but rebuttable one, with the burden of proving a
‘mental disorder’ capable of negating criminal liability being placed
on the accused.30 Applying this analysis to the presumption of
innocence, it is clearly foundational but rebuttable; it places the onus
of proving guilt on the State/the prosecution, but is of course rou-
tinely rebutted, in practice.
Some presumptions are based on common-sense and knowledge of
how things generally are – what one might term ‘real world’ or
‘empirically based’ presumptions. It does not seem unreasonable to
presume sanity; although many people suﬀer from mental disorders,
some of which may aﬀect responsibility for criminal behaviours, most
people’s mental states are such that they may be treated as ‘respon-
sible’. In some jurisdictions, such as England and Scotland, the pre-
sumption that a child under a certain age cannot be guilty of an
oﬀence is also empirically based, since very young children are, as a
27 T. Denning, ‘Presumptions and Burdens’ (1945) Law Quarterly Review 379, 379.
28 F. Raitt, Evidence: Principles, Policy and Practice (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2013),
para 6–18.
29 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s. 50 as amended by Children and
Young Persons Act 1963, s. 16(1) (emphasis added). The wording of the equivalent
Scottish provision is identical, save that the relevant age in Scotland is eight. Chil-
dren under the age of 12 are not prosecuted in Scotland but are subject to the
Children’s Hearing System, which focusses on their welfare. For a critique of these
provisions, see C. McDiarmid, ‘An Age of Complexity: Children and Criminal
Responsibility in Law’ (2014) 13 Youth Justice 145.
30 For English law see McNaghten (1843) 10 Cl & F 200, 8 ER 718; Bratty v A-G
for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386. In Scotland this is governed by statute: Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 51A: ‘Mental disorder’ must be proven by the
accused on the balance of probabilities.
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matter of fact, incapable of forming the requisite mental element
necessary to commit a crime. However, the age of criminal respon-
sibility varies from country to country: it is 15 in Norway, for
example. In some jurisdictions the choice of one age rather than
another may be said to be based on policy, rather than on empirical
evidence. It reﬂects the attitude which that particular society takes
towards its children. Even if a Norwegian prosecutor were able to
demonstrate that a speciﬁc 14 year old child – or even that the
majority of 14 year old children – had suﬃcient maturity to be called
to account in a criminal court, this would not allow a prosecution to
go ahead. This, then, is more of a legal rule than a presumption,
embodying the normative proposition that society ought to treat
children in a particular way. Likewise, the presumption of innocence
may be said to be a normative proposition, reﬂecting policy. But what
exactly is that policy? To answer this we must ﬁrst consider: to what
sort of ‘innocence’ does the presumption of innocence refer?
V ‘FACTUAL’ AND ‘LEGAL’ GUILT AND INNOCENCE
A distinction can be drawn between ‘factual guilt’ (the accused did, as
a matter of fact, perform the criminal act with the requisite mens rea),
and ‘legal guilt’ (the prosecution was able to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt and in conformity with due process that the ac-
cused performed the criminal act, etc.) The corollary of labelling
those who ‘did it’ as ‘factually guilt’ is that those who did not ‘do it’
may be described as being ‘factually innocent’.31 Some accounts do
seem to suggest that the presumption of innocence is a ‘real world’ or
‘empirically based’ presumption based on the likelihood that the
accused is factually innocent, but this is surely not the case. It may be
that most people are ‘good, honest and free from blame’,32 but those
who are accused of having committed a criminal oﬀence are not to be
equated with ‘most people’ since the vast majority of accused persons
31 ‘Factual innocence’ and ‘factual guilt’ are the terms used in H.L. Packer, ‘Two
Models of the Criminal Process’ (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1;
H.L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1968), 161. Stuckenberg draws a similar distinction, contrasting ‘real’ and
‘formal’ innocence (n 15 above), 307–308. Laudan uses the terms ‘material inno-
cence’ and ‘probatory innocence’: see text at n 35, below.
32 J.B. Thayer, ‘The Presumption of Innocence in Criminal Cases’ (1896–1897) 6
Yale Law Journal 185,189.
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have, in fact, committed a crime and are therefore ‘factually guilty’
rather than ‘factually innocent’.
The distinction between ‘factual guilt’ and ‘legal guilt’ recognises
that even one who is ‘factually guilty’ may not necessarily be con-
victed. Perhaps eye-witnesses are unable to identify the accused as the
perpetrator; perhaps the prosecutor inadvertently reveals the accu-
sed’s previous convictions to the jury at the start of the trial, neces-
sitating an acquittal. There are many ways in which a prosecution
may fail. The rules of evidence vary from one jurisdiction to another,
but all have due process requirements, breach of some of which can
mean that even a ‘factually guilty’ accused must be acquitted. Of
course, the great majority of accused persons plead guilty or are
convicted after trial. Thus the presumption of innocence postulates
neither that it is more likely than not that the accused is factually
innocent, nor that he is legally innocent, since both are empirically
false. The presumption of innocence is not a predictor of anything.
Rather, as suggested previously, I contend that it is best viewed as a
normative proposition, reﬂecting a policy decision that the State
should treat its citizens in a particular way.
The proposal being advocated here builds on Herbert Packer’s
approach: he regarded the presumption of innocence as primarily ‘a
direction to oﬃcials how they are to proceed’.33 It seems, however,
that Packer’s focus was on ‘legal’ rather than ‘factual’ innocence:
… the presumption of innocence serves to force into play all the qualifying and
disabling doctrines that limit the use of the criminal sanction against the
individual, thereby enhancing his opportunity to secure a favorable outcome
… the factually guilty may nonetheless be legally innocent and should there-
fore be given a chance to qualify for that kind of treatment.34
Larry Laudan draws a similar distinction between what he calls
material innocence or ‘innocencem’ (the accused ‘did not commit the
crime’) and probatory innocence or ‘innocencep’ (the accused ‘was
acquitted or otherwise released from judicial scrutiny’).35 Laudan
later makes clear that at the pre-trial stage, innocencep means that the
33 Packer (n 31 above). For a similar approach see L.H. Tribe, ‘An Ounce of
Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell’ (1970) 56 Virginia Law
Review 371.
34 Packer, ibid., 17 and 167, respectively.
35 L. Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 12. See also L. Laudan, ‘The Pre-
sumption of Innocence: Material or Probatory?’(2005) Legal Theory 333, 339.
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legal system has not yet established guilt/there is as yet no inculpatory
evidence. He too contends that the ‘innocence’ which is to be pre-
sumed should be probatory innocence. He argues that since an
acquittal does not mean that the jury believe that the defendant
‘didn’t do it’ (innocencem), but rather means only that the jury is not
satisﬁed that guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt
(innocencep), it is unnecessary for them to start with a presumption of
material innocence. He also points out that since jurors know nothing
about the defendant or the case prior to the trial, they have no basis
for assuming material innocence. Since they are well aware that the
State does not prosecute people without good reason, asking jurors to
assume material innocence is to insult their intelligence. He con-
cludes: ‘By contrast, instructing the juror to assume she has seen as
yet no evidence of the defendant’s guilt correctly mirrors the juror’s
own epistemic situation and thus is an injunction that she can act on
in good conscience.’36 Laudan does, however, accept that jurors do in
fact construe ‘innocence’ as meaning ‘material innocence’.37
It seems to me that a trial judge who focussed on innocencep in her
address to the jury would in eﬀect be saying ‘you must presume that
the guilt of the accused has not yet been proved’– which seems to be
stating the obvious, and is arguably more insulting to jurors’ intel-
ligence than asking them to presume that the accused is materially
innocent. Since Laudan treats the presumption as ‘a mechanism for
allocating the burden of proof’, he holds that its sole application is
during the trial.38 By contrast, I advocate a broader role for the
presumption, namely that the key players in the criminal process
(professionals such as police, prosecutors and judges, as well as lay
participants such as jurors) should adopt the presumption of inno-
cence as a practical attitude. I will consider broad and narrow
applications for the presumption in the following section. For present
purposes, however, it is important to note that the broader applica-
tion I advocate relates to innocencem: irrespective of their personal
beliefs in the material guilt or innocence of the suspect/accused they
must endeavour to behave as if they were dealing with a person who
has done nothing wrong, to the extent that this is possible. Laudan is
36 Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law, ibid., 105.
37 ‘When a judge instructs jurors that they should presume the defendant to be
innocent until proven otherwise, they will almost certainly interpret that as com-
mitting them to believe that the defendant did not perpetrate the crime.’ (Ibid., 96).
38 ‘[T]here is not the slightest warrant for supposing that the [presumption of
innocence] governs events beyond the trial itself.’ (Ibid., 94).
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right to say that an acquittal does not mean that that the accused has
been declared to be ‘innocent’ – the choice of verdict is between
‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’, and a fact-ﬁnder who delivers the latter
verdict may well have some level of belief that the accused did, in fact,
commit the crime, but is not satisﬁed that this has been established
beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, I suggest that Laudan is
not correct to insist that the presumption of innocence must refer to
innocencep. In the event of an acquittal, the presumption requires us
to put aside any lingering doubts or suspicions about the defendant.
Henceforth, he is to be treated in the same way as any other citizen:
not merely as someone whose guilt the prosecution has been unable
to establish, but as someone who has committed no crime, in other
words, he beneﬁts from a presumption of material innocence.
VI BROAD AND NARROW APPLICATION FOR THE
PRESUMPTION
The approach being proposed in this article is a controversial one,
with many scholars arguing that the presumption has no application
other than at trial. Some doubt that it is sensible to presume inno-
cence at any stage. One such was Jeremy Bentham:
The defendant is not in fact treated as if he were innocent, and it would be
absurd and inconsistent to deal by him as if he were. The state he is in is a
dubious one, betwixt non-delinquency and delinquency: supposing him non-
delinquent, then immediately should the procedure against him drop: every-
thing that follows is oppression and injustice.39
Bentham highlights the contradiction inherent in the State declaring
that an accused beneﬁts from a presumption of innocence, while
simultaneously acting in ways which suggest quite the opposite. As
we have seen, Laudan dismisses any suggestion that the presumption
applies beyond the conﬁnes of the trial. He regards suggestions that it
might have a broader application as merely ‘wishful thinking’, since
pre-trial there is ‘a host of decisions’ made by State oﬃcials which are
incompatible with such an approach. For example, the police who
39 J. Bentham, Principles of Judicial Procedure, Chapter XXIX: ‘Natural and
Technical Systems Compared’. Similarly, it has been suggested that Packer regarded
the presumption of innocence as ‘an unrealistic command’ to ignore the presumption
of guilt ‘even though in most cases the suspect is guilty’: S. Baradaran, ‘Restoring the
Presumption of Innocence’ (2011) 72 Ohio State Legal Journal 723, 756.
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arrest a suspect cannot plausibly believe that he is innocent, since one
can only be arrested if there is probable cause,40 and a judge who
denies bail to an accused is clearly not presuming innocence.41 There
are, however, traces of a broader approach in the French Declaration
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), Art 9 of which states:
As all persons are held innocent until they shall have been declared guilty, if
arrest shall be deemed indispensable, all harshness not essential to the securing
of the prisoner’s person shall be severely repressed by law.
This recognises that some harsh treatment may be unavoidable – a
suspect may have to be arrested – but declares that such treatment
should be limited to that which is necessary for the proper investi-
gation of the crime. Likewise, I accept that a suspect cannot be
treated entirely the same as a non-suspect citizen: once suspicion of
criminality focuses on a particular individual, his status does change,
and his rights to liberty and to bodily integrity may be curtailed. For
instance, he may be required to attend for police questioning, and will
not generally be free to terminate the interview at a time of his
choosing. He may have to submit to the taking of ﬁngerprints and
photographs, to participate in an identiﬁcation parade, to a search of
his home, oﬃce, or person, and to attend court for trial. This is
regrettable, but unavoidable if the state is to fulﬁl its responsibility to
investigate allegations of criminal wrongdoing. The crucial point is
that although becoming a suspect does impose certain burdens, it is
not to be equated to the status of one whose guilt has been formally
established. If police and other state oﬃcials maintain an awareness
of this distinction, infringement of rights is more likely to be kept to
the minimum required to further the investigation, and the attitude of
such oﬃcials towards the suspect is less likely to degenerate into one
of disrespect, or even distain.
Although the majority of courts and commentators take the view
that the presumption has no application pre-trial, some authors have
advocated a broader role – often a very broad role indeed.42 Thus
40 In the UK, ‘reasonable suspicion’ rather than ‘probably cause’ is the threshold
for arrest, but Laudan’s argument is equally applicable in the UK.
41 Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law, 95.
42 For example, Ashworth (n 18 above), 249; Baradaran (n 39 above), 723; H.
Stewart, ‘The Right to be Presumed Innocent’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law & Philosophy
407; P. DeAngelis, ‘Racial Proﬁling and the Presumption of Innocence’ (2014)
Netherland Journal of Law and Philosophy 43; P. Tomlin, ‘Could the Presumption of
Innocence Protect the Guilty?’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 431; V. Tadros,
THE ROLE OF THE POI 141
Patrick Tomlin argues that since it is grounded in a concern to avoid
inappropriate punishment, the presumption should be applied to
ensure that we avoid excessively punishing those who have been
convicted, hence a sentencing judge should be satisﬁed beyond a
reasonable doubt that the sentence being imposed is not an excessive
one.43 My theory diﬀers from this; although I do believe that the
presumption of innocence can have implications for how we treat
acquitted persons, post-trial, I am of the view that following a con-
viction the presumption of innocence has no further application.
Tomlin believes that the presumption ‘on its own, is not much to
write home about’44 and that ‘to have any teeth … [it] must be
coupled with a robust epistemic standard … of ‘‘beyond reasonable
doubt’’.’45 Thus his approach relates more to the standard of proof
than the presumption of innocence.
Victor Tadros also favours a broader role for the presumption,
and explores its implications for substantive law.46 He contends that
a breach of the presumption of innocence occurs where a legislature
lowers the standard of proof, or removes some of the conditions of
liability from the deﬁnition of an oﬀence, with a view to making it
easier to secure a conviction:
Where this is done the state warrants the conviction of defendants without
meeting the standard of proof that the conditions of liability have been ful-
ﬁlled. This implies the attitude that it is permissible to publicly condemn and
punish citizens without reaching the epistemic standard appropriate for these
activities.47
Again, this seems more about the standard of proof than the pre-
sumption.
Antony Duﬀ suggests that we recognise several presumptions of
innocence, each of which operates in diﬀerent ways and with diﬀerent
Footnote 42 continued
‘The Ideal of the Presumption of Innocence’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy
449.
43 Tomlin, ibid., 432.
44 Ibid., 433.
45 Ibid.
46 Tadros, (n 42 above).
47 Ibid., 459.
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results.48 Thus Duﬀ argues that under English law, a presumption of
innocence prevents a prosecution from going ahead without their
being ‘a realistic prospect of conviction’, while a diﬀerent and more
familiar presumption of innocence operates during the trial. Duﬀ
suggests that we recognize presumptions of innocence that operate
beyond the criminal process, and indeed, beyond the law, in the
interactions between citizens, and between citizen and state.49 The
approach adopted in the present article diﬀers from those proposed
by Tomlin, Tadros or Duﬀ, in that it conﬁnes the operation of the
presumption of innocence to the criminal process.
VII THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AS PRACTICAL
ATTITUDE AND POLITICAL STATEMENT
The reality, of course, is that once suspicion focuses on a particular
individual, the mind set of many players in the criminal justice system
is that the suspect ‘is probably guilty’.50 It might be thought that this
is an entirely appropriate stance for the police to take, and perhaps
also for the prosecution, and prosecution expert witnesses; they are,
after all, in the business of helping to build a case against the suspect.
I suggest that treating the presumption of innocence as a practical
attitude serves to remind them to challenge this and helps to alert
investigators to the dangers inherent in assuming guilt. These dangers
are twofold: ﬁrst, it may blind them from considering alternative
explanations, such as that the perpetrator may be someone else en-
tirely. Presuming innocence makes it more likely that the police will
look for evidence which might exonerate the suspect, rather than
focussing only on incriminating evidence. Secondly, treating suspects
as ‘probably guilty’ makes it easier for the police to ‘justify’ threat-
ening or even physically abusing suspects, heightening the dangers of
false confessions; requiring the police to treat suspects as if they were
48 R.A. Duﬀ, ‘Who must Presume Whom to be Innocent of What?’ (2013) 42
Netherland Journal of Law and Philosophy 170, 179. See also Duﬀ (n 2 above).
49 R.A. Duﬀ, ‘Presumptions Broad and Narrow’ (2013) Netherland Journal of Law
and Philosophy 268.
50 See Packer (n 31 above) 160–161.
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innocent makes such practices less likely.51 Both dangers increase the
likelihood of wrongful conviction.
As the case builds against the suspect and the trial approaches, it is
inevitable that many of the players in the criminal justice system will
have formed the hypothesis, if not in fact reached the conclusion, that
the accused is indeed guilty. But just as good scientists test their
hypotheses by trying to ﬁnd consequences which would render them
false,52 so too should those in the criminal justice system strive to
consider scenarios and explanations which are inconsistent with the
guilt of the accused. Fact-ﬁnders (whether judges or jurors) should
take a cautious and somewhat sceptical approach to the evidence due
to its potential fallibility. They should be particularly sceptical of the
types of evidence which have been shown to be unreliable, such as
‘ﬂeeting glance’ identiﬁcations, where the perpetrator and witness
were not acquainted prior to the incident, and the witness saw the
perpetrator for a short time.53 Evidence may be given by a ‘jailhouse
informant’ – the accused’s cell mate may claim that the accused
confessed to the crime. A high degree of scepticism seems appropriate
here too, particularly where a deal has been struck with the State such
that testimony is given in exchange for a reduced sentence for the
informant.54 Michael Risinger’s work reminds us that even scientiﬁc
evidence is susceptible to human error. He has highlighted the dan-
gers of wrongful conviction when an expert is given independent
reasons to assume that the suspect is indeed the perpetrator.55 For
instance, a scientist who has been asked to compare a suspect’s ﬁn-
gerprints with a print left at the crime scene may learn that the sus-
pect has already been identiﬁed as the perpetrator by an eyewitness.
51 See A. Leo et al., ‘Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal
Safeguards in the 21st century’ (2006) 2 Wisconsin Law Review 479. Exoneration
studies in the USA have estimated that false confessions account for 15–16% of
wrongful conviction cases. For a useful summary of the literature see F. Stark,
‘Confession Evidence’ in J. Chalmers, F. Leverick and A. Shaw (eds.), Post-Cor-
roboration Safeguards Review Report of the Academic Expert Group (2014), available
at: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0046/00460650.pdf.
52 K. Popper, The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery (London: Routledge, 1959).
53 E.F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1979);
S. Rabner, ‘Evaluating Eyewitness Identiﬁcation Evidence in the 21st Century’
(2012) 87 New York University Law Review 1249.
54 S.A. Drizin and R.A. Leo, ‘The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World’ (2003–2004) 82 North Carolina Law Review 891.
55 D.M. Risinger, ‘NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Glass Nine-tenths
Full (This is about the Other Tenth)’ (2009) 50 Jurimetrics 21.
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Risinger cites several empirical studies which demonstrate that such
‘expectancy-inducing information’ can bias the results of forensic
examinations.56 Taking a sceptical approach to potentially unreliable
evidence is, of course, an epistemic requirement, but it is all too easy
for police and prosecutors to lose sight of this in the desire to solve
the case, particularly if the crime is a serious one. Adopting the
presumption of innocence as a practical attitude helps guard against
this.
It might be objected that this is taking things too far. Surely it is
enough that oﬃcials, forensic experts, jurors etc. refrain from oper-
ating according to a ‘presumption of guilt’? Might it not be suﬃcient
for them to suspend all judgment, neither presuming guilt nor
innocence? Richard Posner suggests that a ‘principle of neutrality’
could be employed instead. At the start of a trial an ‘unbiased fact-
ﬁnder’ such as a judge or juror should begin with ‘prior odds of 1 to 1
that the … prosecutor has a meritorious case’.57 Sometimes called
‘even odds’ or ‘50/50’, where prior odds of 1:1 are given for a par-
ticular proposition, this represents an assessment that a proposition is
just as likely to be true as to be false. Similarly to Packer and Laudan,
Posner is clearly referring to probatory innocence: fact-ﬁnders should
begin the trial believing that it is equally likely that the prosecution or
the defence will prevail. Thus it might be suggested that the right to a
‘fair’ hearing by an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’, safeguarded
by Art 6(1) of the ECHR and other international conventions,58
would require a judge or juror to adopt Posner’s 1:1 assessment,
neither favouring the accused nor the prosecution. Richard Friedman
criticises Posner’s approach.59 Friedman points out that if ‘Observer’
was asked to assess the likelihood that ‘Passerby’ (a stranger Ob-
server encounters on the street) had assaulted Passerby’s neighbour
on a particular occasion, Observer would be likely to assess the odds
that Passerby had committed such an assault as very low: after all, as
Friedman reminds us, ‘most people do not violently assault their
neighbors on or about a given date, and Observer has no information
concerning Passerby that would increase the odds.’60 The reader is
then asked to imagine that Observer has now become Juror, and
56 Ibid., 29.
57 R. Posner, ‘An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence’ (1999) 51 Stanford
Law Review 1477, 1514.
58 For example, art 11(d) of the Canadian Charter.
59 Friedman (n 17 above).
60 Ibid., 880.
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Passerby is now the Accused. If at the start of the trial Juror would
assess the likelihood that Accused is guilty of having assaulted the
neighbour as being even odds, this can only be based on the change of
venue. In other words, Juror is allowing the fact that Accused is on
trial as itself evidence of guilt – and it is this very assessment which
the presumption of innocence is designed to prevent. Thus Friedman
concludes that Posner’s approach breaches the presumption of
innocence.61
A common allegorical personiﬁcation depicts justice as a woman
who is holding a set of balance scales, comprising a balanced beam
and two pans. The evidence for the prosecution is to be weighed on
one pan of the scales, with evidence for the accused being weighed on
the other. According to the neutrality principle, at the start of the
trial the fact-ﬁnder should regard the pans as equally balanced. The
standard of proof – ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ – means that con-
viction can only follow where the evidence causes the scales to tilt so
heavily in favour of the prosecution case that there remains no rea-
sonable doubt but that the accused is guilty. In contrast to this, I
suggest that, at the start of a trial, fact-ﬁnders should not approach
the prosecution and defence positions as being similar to a set of
evenly balanced scales. Instead, the presumption of innocence re-
quires that the starting point is for one side of the scales to be tipped
in favour of the accused. This means that rather than the prosecution
presenting its case to jurors who are ‘neutral’ or open-minded about
the accused’s guilt or innocence, it faces an uphill struggle to change
their minds from believing that the accused did not commit the crime,
to being convinced of the opposite. The requirement for proof of guilt
to be established ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ tells the jurors where
they must end up in order to convict. The presumption of innocence
tells them from where they must begin – with our scale pans on the
side of ‘not guilty’.
The neutrality principle fails to recognize that it is the accused who
has most to lose. This is reﬂected in Blackstone’s claim that ‘it is
better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent party
suﬀer’.62 Blackstone’s maxim is often quoted, but its rationale is
61 Friedman (n 17 above), 874. Laudan reaches the same conclusion: Truth, Error,
and Criminal Law, 105.
62 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (1765), 713.
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rarely articulated.63 Others quote diﬀerent ratios, such as 100 guilty
to 1 innocent. Some have tried to devise the ‘correct’ ratio, believing
that the proportions we decide upon reﬂect the extent to which we are
prepared to tolerate false convictions.64 I believe that ﬁxating on
whether we should refer to ‘10 to 1’, ‘50 to 1’ or ‘100 to 1’ is beside the
point. Saying that it is better that 10, 50 or 100 guilty persons escape
than that one innocent party suﬀer should not be taken to mean that
an error rate in wrongful convictions of 10%, 2% or 1% (as the case
may be) is acceptable. Rather, the maxim reﬂects the sentiment that
while we accept that no justice system can be infallible, we regard
wrongful convictions as a particularly grave injustice.65 Why should
this be so? Both outcomes are equally detrimental to the victim of the
crime, for the true perpetrator has not received his just deserts in
either case. But with a wrongful conviction the State punishes an
innocent person, depriving him of his liberty, and in some jurisdic-
tions, perhaps even his life. Even in less serious cases where the
punishment is more likely to be a monetary one, a verdict of guilty
involves stigma and loss of reputation. The ‘encumbrances of a
criminal conviction’66 can include forfeiture of civil rights, such as the
right to sit on a jury and the right to vote in parliamentary elections,
63 As Halvorsen notes, that wrongful convictions are much worse than wrongful
acquittals is ‘more or less taken for granted as self-evidently true’. (V. Halvorsen, ‘Is
it Better that Ten Guilty Persons Go Free Than that One Innocent Person be
Convicted?’ (2004) 23 Criminal Justice Ethics 3).
64 Ibid. For an entertaining account of the many diﬀerent ratios which have been
proposed, see A. Volokh, ‘nGuilty Men’ (1997–1998) University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 173.
65 Not all authors are persuaded that this is self-evident. Youngjae Lee argues that
since the State owes its citizens a duty of physical security, if it has to choose between
conviction of defendants using a lower standard of proof, or instead accepting that
the higher proof standard will mean that more murderers will be acquitted and thus
more innocent citizens will be killed, it is not obvious that the latter is morally
preferable. (Y. Lee, ‘Deontology, Political Morality, and the State’ (2010–2011) 8
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 385, 391).
66 J. Schonsheck, On Criminalization: An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal
Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1994), 5–6. See also G.J. Chin, ‘What
are Defence Lawyers For? Links between Collateral Consequences and the Criminal
Process’ (2012–2013) 45 Texas Tech Law Review 151, 152 who argues that ‘in many
cases, collateral consequences, not ﬁne or imprisonment, are the most signiﬁcant
consequences in criminal cases. … What is at stake for many defendants facing
criminal charges is not a long stretch in prison, but a lifetime with a criminal record.
Accordingly, it attorneys want to help clients, they must think about collateral
consequences.’
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and impacts on the convict’s ability to ﬁnd employment. Since pun-
ishment involves harsh treatment, it requires strong justiﬁcation and
it is the fact that a person has been convicted – that he has been shown
to a high level of certainty (‘beyond a reasonable doubt’) to have
breached the norms of the criminal law – which justiﬁes its inﬂiction.
The presumption of innocence reminds us that unless and until an
accused person’s guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, follow-
ing a fair trial and according to due process, the State lacks moral
legitimacy if it inﬂicts harsh treatment or imposes unpleasant con-
sequences on a citizen. In the case of In re Winship67 the US Supreme
Court stressed that all of us, as citizens, need to be conﬁdent that if
we are ever charged with a crime we cannot be convicted unless the
prosecution can establish our guilt to a high degree of certainty.
Youngjae Lee makes a similar point when he argues that
…fundamental legal protections that are promised to individuals … are not
merely requirements that ﬂow directly from laws of morality that dictate how
individuals ought to treat one another. They also spell out the proper rela-
tionship between the government and the governed, and they are among the
many conditions that attach to the government’s exclusive possession and use
of the power to criminalize and punish.68
The legal protections Lee has in mind are the requirement for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the principle that punishment should
not exceed that which is deserved, but it may equally be said – and it
is the focus of my argument – that the presumption of innocence is a
legal protection which reﬂects the proper relationship which should
apply between citizen and State.
It may, however, be suggested that failure to convict a guilty
murderer, for example, will lead to greater loss of life, since the
murderer may go on to kill yet more people. However, a wrongful
conviction does not change this: the real murderer remains at liberty
to perpetrate further murders. Perhaps the wrongful conviction will
prevent some killings, since the knowledge that a person has been
imprisoned, or even executed, for murder may deter other would-be
murderers. On this basis, a wrongful conviction might be said to be
justiﬁed on utilitarian grounds. However, as even Bentham accepted,
the discovery that an innocent person has been convicted – or even
the suspicion that this might be so – can have a much more detri-
67 397 U.S. 358, 363–364 (1970).
68 N 65 above, 399.
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mental impact on people’s conﬁdence in the criminal process than the
knowledge that some guilty people manage to escape their just de-
serts. That society needs to be conﬁdent that convicted people are in
fact guilty was also stressed by the Court in Winship. In England,
following a spate of wrongful convictions, the UK Government
established a Royal Commission to recommend changes to the
criminal process. The Commission noted:
The great majority of criminal trials are conducted in a manner which all the
participants regard as fair, and we see no reason to believe that the great
majority of verdicts, whether guilt or not guilty, are not correct… But the
damage done by the minority of cases in which the system is seen to have failed
is out of all proportion to their number.69
Loss of public conﬁdence in criminal trials may lead to fewer crimes
being reported to the police, a reluctance on the part of witnesses to
come forward, and calls for changes to be made to the criminal
process.70 Thus the presumption has high instrumental value: it helps
secure the rectitude of verdicts, reducing the likelihood of factually
innocent people being convicted, and contributes to public trust in
the justice system. Its normative value is equally crucial: it conveys an
important message about the relationship which ought to exist be-
tween the individual qua suspect/accused and the State. It serves to
remind our key players that they must endeavour to treat the accused,
so far as possible, as they would treat any other citizen. It also
communicates to the accused that he remains part of the polity, with
status and rights, even though suspected of breaking the polity’s
norms. Thus Thomas Weigend suggests that the presumption in-
structs law enforcement oﬃcials:
‘‘Assume that the suspect did not commit the crime …and then ask yourself
whether you can do to him what you intend to do.’’ By that standard, any
interference with the suspect’s rights is illegitimate unless it can be based on
valid grounds distinct from an assumption that he is in fact guilty.71
69 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report, Cmnd 2263, London: HMSO,
1993.
70 R. Ricciardelli, J.G. Bell and K.A. Clow, ‘Student Attitudes toward Wrongful
Conviction’ (2009) 51 Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 411, 413.
71 N 15 above, 196. See also T. Weigend, ‘Assuming that the Defendant is Not
Guilty: The Presumption of Innocence in the German System of Criminal Justice’
(2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 285, 287.
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VIII IMPLICATIONS
Adoption of the presumption of innocence as a practical attitude has
implications at several points in the criminal process, from ﬁrst sus-
picion of wrongdoing to the stage of ﬁnal conviction. A detailed
examination of each of these may well merit an article in its own
right: what follows is a brief sketch.
8.1 Police Powers
Police powers of search, detention and questioning almost invariably
breach individuals’ rights to privacy, bodily autonomy and liberty.
The State routinely deprives convicted persons of these rights – but it
is the very fact of conviction which justiﬁes their abrogation. When
formulating rules on police powers, therefore, legislators should keep
in mind that these will apply to ‘suspects’, not ‘convicts’ – that is, to
persons who are presumptively innocent. In general, police powers to
stop, detain, question, or search citizens are contingent on them
having ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘probable cause’ to believe that the
person being detained or searched has committed a criminal of-
fence.72 The presumption of innocence reminds law enforcement
oﬃcers that they must exercise their powers with restraint. If rea-
sonable suspicion/probable cause were synonymous with guilt, then
more extensive police powers would be permissible. Instead, the
presumption of innocence supports the demand for a minimalist
approach: reasonable suspicion may justify the detention of an
individual, but only for a limited (and relatively short) period, not
indeﬁnitely. Reasonable suspicion may be suﬃcient justiﬁcation for
an external body search, but for more invasive searches legal systems
commonly require a court warrant, with the grounds for suspicion
being veriﬁed by a member of the judiciary. Judicial oversight is
required for these more intrusive searches, since, as a neutral arbiter,
a judge should ﬁnd it easier than a police oﬃcer or prosecutor to keep
in mind the requirements of the presumption of innocence when
weighing the epistemic value of the search against the inevitable in-
vasion of privacy that this will entail for the suspect.
When the presumption is treated as an aspect of, or even equiv-
alent to, the burden of proof, this lends weight to the notion that an
72 There are, however, exceptions to the general rule that reasonable suspicion is
required. Controversially, the Terrorism Act 2000 gave the police in the UK power
to stop, search and detain individuals in certain designated areas, without reasonable
suspicion.
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accused person should not co-operate with the state in any way,
either before or during the trial: if it is for the state to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, why should the accused be expected, far
less required, to make this job any easier? This is not a helpful ap-
proach. It is not inconsistent with the presumption of innocence to
require a suspect to co-operate to some extent with the police
investigation. Clearly, a balance has to be struck between the interests
of the (presumed innocent) accused and those of the State in the
investigation of crime and the punishment of oﬀenders. If the pre-
sumption of innocence were interpreted as meaning ‘you are not
expected to co-operate lest you help the prosecution establish its case
against you’, this would surely mean that we were operating under a
presumption of guilt! Where a credible allegation of wrongdoing has
been made against someone this must be rigorously investigated and,
if need be, tested at trial. Adopting the presumption of innocence as a
practical attitude means that during this process suspects must be
aﬀorded respect and treated in a way which preserves their dignity.
They may be invited to attend the police station for questioning. If
they are not willing to come, we may have to force them to do so, but
only as a last resort. In the police station, we do not deny them
refreshments or comfort breaks, and we try to minimize the period
during which we deprive them of liberty. We may have to insist that
suspects provide ﬁngerprints, etc. A person against whom there is a
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing has both a moral and a legal
duty to assist in the investigation: the moral duty arises because, as
citizens, we should be ready to face up to accusations. The extent of
the legal duty will vary from one jurisdiction to another. For exam-
ple, in Scotland, legislation requires suspects to provide certain de-
tails which will enable their identity to be veriﬁed by the police, but
they need not answer any additional questions.73 Like their Scottish
counterparts, suspects in police custody in America have a privilege
against self-incrimination.74 By contrast, in England a suspect must
provide details of potential defences during police questioning, or risk
adverse inferences being drawn by the fact ﬁnder if a defence is
73 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 14(9): ‘A person detained [by the
police for questioning]… shall be under no obligation to answer any question other
than to give the information mentioned in subsection (10) below, and a consta-
ble shall so inform him both on so detaining him and on arrival at the police station
or other premises.’ Section 14(10): ‘That information is – (a)the person’s name;
(b)the person’s address; (c)the person’s date of birth; (d)the person’s place of birth…
and (e)the person’s nationality.’
74 Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Edwards v Arizona 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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produced for the ﬁrst time at trial.75 Which of these jurisdictions
strikes the right approach regarding how much co-operation society
is entitled to expect from a suspect is beyond the scope of this article;
the point is that in each jurisdiction the police can properly say to a
suspect: ‘As a presumptively innocent person [i.e. even though you
may be innocent] you have a duty to cooperate’.
8.2 Incarceration Pre-trial
The adoption of a broadly based presumption of innocence may have
implications for other aspects of a State’s treatment of citizens pre-
trial, for example, in relation to the use of racial proﬁling,76 but it is
most controversial in respect of pre-trial incarceration. The Irish Law
Reform Commission (ILRC) noted the two approaches which may
be taken here.77 The more common approach, as previously de-
scribed, treats the presumption as a procedural rule which operates
only during the criminal trial and has no application outside that
forum. The second treats it as ‘a principle governing all stages of the
criminal process’:
If the ﬁrst view of the presumption is correct, it would not necessarily be
impermissible to impose restrictions on the accused designed to ensure pur-
poses other than his attendance at trial. Thus pre-trial detention to prevent
crime would be acceptable. However, if the second view of the presumption of
innocence is adopted, restrictions prior to trial, if any, must be minimal and
must be designed to ensure that his trial will take place.78
75 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 34: ‘Where, in any proceedings
against a person for an oﬀence, evidence is given that the accused … on being
questioned under caution by a constable trying to discover whether or by whom the
oﬀence had been committed, failed to mention any fact relied on in his defence in
those proceedings … the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty
of the oﬀence charged, may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper.’
For criticism of the provision see D. Birch, ‘Suﬀering in Silence: a Cost-Beneﬁt
Analysis of Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994’ [1999]
Crim. L.R. 769; J. Jackson, ‘Silence and Proof: Extending the Boundaries of Crim-
inal Proceedings in the United Kingdom’ (2001) International Journal of Evidence &
Proof 145.
76 DeAngelis (n 43 above).
77 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Report on an Examination of the Law of
Bail (LRC 50–1995).
78 Ibid., para 5.29.
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In 1951 the US Supreme Court declared that failure to recognise a
right to pre-trial bail would make meaningless the presumption of
innocence,79 but by 1979 the Court had reached the opposite con-
clusion, holding that the presumption ‘has no application to a
determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during conﬁnement
before his trial has even begun’.80 By contrast, the courts in Ireland
adopt the second of the views described by the ILRC.81 There is also
a presumption in favour of bail in both English and Scottish law,82
but this is often explained as being required by the right to liberty. As
we have seen, however, a convicted person has no such right, thus the
presumption of innocence again reminds us that since an accused is
not to be treated as if he has already been found guilty, pre-trial
incarceration cannot be justiﬁed on the basis that the accused ‘is
guilty’. Bail may be denied for someone who has previously ab-
sconded pre-trial, since they have shown that they are a ﬂight-risk.83
It is the past, ascertained behaviour (the failure to turn up for a trial)
which justiﬁes the denial of bail, rather than an assumption that they
are guilty of this current charge. In the case of serious crimes such as
murder, it may be reasonable to base bail decisions on generaliza-
tions: if it is the case that people who are bailed on a charge of
murder often attempt to abscond, a jurisdiction could adopt a policy
of remanding in custody all who face such charges. This does not
imply that all of those who are accused of murder are guilty as
charged. Pre-trial ﬂight may not be synonymous with guilt: in some
cases even an innocent accused may rate the chances of acquittal as
low. While bail may be refused for crime-prevention purposes due to
the accused’s previous convictions – a person’s record does tell us
79 Stack v Boyle 342 US 1, 3 (1951).
80 Bell v Wolﬁsh 441 US 520, 533 (1979). This is also the position in Canada: R v
Pearson (1993) 17 C.R. (4th) 1, 77 CCC (3rd) 124. For a history of bail in the USA,
see: M.J. Hegreness, ‘America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail’ (2013) 55
Arizona Law Review 909. See also D. Kiselbach, ‘Pre-trial Criminal Procedure:
Preventive Detention and the Presumption of Innocence’ (1989) 31 Criminal Law
Quarterly 168.
81 O’Callaghan [1966] IR 501. This is also the approach taken in New South
Wales: P. Shrestha, ‘Two Steps Back: The Presumption of Innocence and Changes to
the Bail Act 2013 (NSW)’ (2015) 37 Sydney Law Review 47.
82 England: Bail Act 1976, s 4; Scotland: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
s 23B.
83 See the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 23C(1)(a) which allows a
court to refuse bail if there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the accused might abscond or
fail to appear at the trial diet.
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about propensity to behave in a particular fashion in future – it
cannot be refused on the basis that solely by virtue of being charged
with this crime, it is reasonable to conclude that an accused might
commit ‘further crimes’ while awaiting trial. Similarly, while the
strength of the case against the accused can be taken into account in
determining the risk of ﬂight, bail should not be denied solely on the
strength of the case, since this is the very issue which has to be
determined at trial.84
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated
repeatedly85 that member states must have ‘due regard to the pre-
sumption of innocence’ in ensuring that pre-trial detention does not
exceed a reasonable time, as required by Art 6(1) of the ECHR.86 Of
course, it may be argued that giving ‘due regard’ to the presumption
of innocence means that any restrictions imposed when bail is granted
are unjustiﬁed; after all, we do not subject non-accused citizens to
equivalent forms of conditional liberty. The presumption of inno-
cence tells us that if conditions are to be imposed in granting bail,
these should be directed at ensuring that the trial takes place, rather
than being based on the presumption that the accused committed the
crime with which he is charged.87
Adopting the presumption of innocence as a practical attitude also
means that where bail is refused and suspects are remanded in cus-
tody awaiting trial, the conditions in which they are conﬁned should
reﬂect their un-tried/presumptively innocent status. Thus they should
be kept separate from convicted prisoners, allowed to wear their own
84 See R.A. Duﬀ, ‘Pre-trial Detention and the Presumption of Innocence’ in A.
Ashworth, L. Zedner and P. Tomlin (eds.), Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 115; L. Stevens, ‘The Meaning of the
Presumption of Innocence for Pre-trial Detention: An Empirical Approach’ (2013)
42 Netherland Journal of Legal Philosophy 239.
85 Letellier v France (1991) 14 EHRR 83, para 35. See also B v Austria (1990) 13
EHRR 20, para 42; Yargci and Sargin v Turkey (1995), 20 EHRR 505, para 50.
86 See also art 5(3) of the ECHR; art 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; art 7.5 of the American Convention on Human Rights; art
20(4)(c) and art 21(4)(c) of the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia, respectively; art 11(b) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and art 7(1)(d) of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights.
87 Art 5(3) of the ECHR provides that accused persons have a right ‘to trial within
a reasonable time or to release pending trial’ and expressly states that pre-trial release
‘may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.’ For an analysis of this in
relation to English law, see P. Leach, ‘Automatic Denial of Bail and the European
Convention’ (1999) Criminal Law Review 300.
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clothes, be entitled to more generous visiting hours, and have greater
access to legal advisors. While these distinctions are recognized in
some jurisdictions (for example, Scotland), conditions elsewhere are
less favourable with untried prisoners being kept in worse conditions
than convicted criminals.88 If the presumption of innocence was
irrelevant to the issue of bail or conditions on remand, our desire to
minimize pre-trial detention would stem from concerns over the
degrading of evidence, or the stress delay causes witnesses, rather
than from a sense that deprivation of liberty is an unacceptable way
to treat a presumptively innocent person.
8.3 Pre-trial or Post-conviction Suggestions of Guilt
In some states in the USA, victims and their family members are
permitted to wear t-shirts, buttons or ribbons, or display other
written signs in court suggesting that the accused is guilty.89 This
practice is not in keeping with the presumption of innocence: estab-
lishing guilt is the function of the prosecution. As such, during the
trial and prior to the verdict only the prosecution ought to be allowed
to suggest that the accused is in fact guilty. Equally problematic is the
so-called ‘perp walk’, in which a suspect’s arrest is engineered by the
police or prosecution to occur when reporters and news cameras are
present, in order to humiliate the suspect and encourage a guilty
plea.90 Challenges to the practice have focussed on whether it violates
the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution which protects citi-
88 See R.L. Lippke, ‘Preventive Pre-trial Detention without Punishment’ (2014) 20
Res Publica 111, 112.
89 See S. Elizabeth, ‘The Newest Spectator Sport: Why Extending Victims’ Rights
to the Spectators’ Gallery Eroded the Presumption of Innocence’ (2008) 58 Duke
Law Journal 275.
90 K.J. Kaiser, ‘Twenty-ﬁrst Century Stocks and Pillory: Perp Walks as Pretrial
Punishment’ (2002–2003) 88 Iowa Law Review 1205. In Government of the United
States of America v Tollman [2008] EWHC 184 the (English) court had to determine
whether the defendants should be extradited to the USA. The court at ﬁrst instance
described as ‘reprehensible’ the US Prosecuting Attorney’s comment that he was
looking forward to having ‘a perp walk’: ‘By this he meant that he intended to walk
publicly through the streets of New York, from the processing centre to the court-
house, with Mrs Tollman handcuﬀed and in leg-irons for the beneﬁt of the press’
[para 38].
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zens’ right to privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures.91
The presumption of innocence has not generally been preyed in aid
since, as we have already noted, US courts regard the presumption as
having no pre-trial application. I suggest that the ‘perp walk’ is a
breach of the presumption of innocence: even the term ‘perp[etrator]
walk’ suggests that the person being arrested is the guilty party.
The approach outlined in this article also means that prior to trial
or following an acquittal, there should be no comments made by
police, prosecutors or judges which give the impression that the ac-
cused is in fact guilty of committing the crime. This is indeed the
stance which has been taken by the ECtHR, which has repeatedly
held that the protection guaranteed by Art 6(2) extends beyond the
criminal trial itself to other situations where the state may be said to
be undercutting the presumption of innocence.92 Thus the Court has
held that the presumption operates before criminal proceedings are
pending,93 and can subsist after the discontinuation of such pro-
ceedings, or following an acquittal. In the recent case of Cleve v
Germany94 the Court reiterated that the presumption protects those
who have been acquitted of a criminal charge from being treated by
public oﬃcials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty.95
8.4 Jury Majorities
If the prosecution is unable to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, the presumption means that the accused is entitled to a verdict
91 Kaiser, ibid. See also R. Hagglund, ‘Constitutional Protections Against the
Harms to Suspects in Custody Stemming from Perp Walks’ (2011–2012) 81 Mis-
sissippi Law Journal 1757; P. Paciocco, ‘Pilloried in the Press: Rethinking the Con-
stitutional Status of the American Perp Walk’ (2013) 16 New Criminal Law Review
50.
92 Cases include Sekanina v Austria (1993) 17 EHRR 221; Rushiti v Austria
(2000) 33 EHRR 1331; Hussain v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 22; Geerings v
Netherlands, [2007] ECHR 191. For a helpful summary see L. Campbell, ‘A Rights-
based Analysis of DNA Retention: Non-conviction Databases and the Liberal State’
(2010) Crim LR 889.
93 Allenet de Ribemont v France App No 15175/89 (1995) 20 EHRR 557. See also
Butkevicius v Lithuania App No 48297/99 (ECHR, 26 March 2002). Accused persons
in France now have a right not to be referred to as if guilty, prior to trial: see F.
Quintard-Morinas, ‘The Presumption of Innocence in the French and Anglo-
American Legal Traditions’ (2010) 58 American Journal of Comparative Law 107,
140.
94 App. No. 48144/09; [2015] ECHR 35.
95 Ibid., para 35.
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of ‘not guilty’. This has consequences for jury majorities. In Scotland,
8 out of 15 jurors must favour conviction before a guilty verdict can
be returned. As Gerry Maher has argued, it is questionable whether a
conviction where 7 jurors have at least a reasonable doubt over guilt
can be equated to proof beyond a reasonable doubt or is compatible
with the presumption of innocence.96 Commentators have tradi-
tionally founded on the requirement for corroborated evidence as a
justiﬁcation for the majority verdict. In 2013, the Scottish Govern-
ment expressed its intention to abolish the requirement for corrob-
oration, prompting a rethink of the ‘simple majority’ verdict.97 In
contrast to this, an English criminal jury comprises 12 jurors, at least
10 of whom must vote in favour of conviction or acquittal, otherwise
a retrial will be ordered. That acquittal is not the outcome even when
9 out of 12 jurors favour a ‘not guilty’ verdict has been criticized as
contrary to the presumption.98
8.5 Retention of DNA samples
The presumption may have other implications post-trial, in respect of
the retention by the State of DNA samples which have been taken
from suspects who have subsequently been acquitted. In S and
Marper v UK99 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found that the
retention of such samples could breach Art 8 of the ECHR (the right
to privacy), and commented on the stigma involved in such retention.
Liz Campbell has argued that DNA retention ‘denotes a degree of
distrust on the part of state agents as to the future criminality of the
person [whose sample is retained] and her likelihood of re-oﬀending,
and thus seems to relate to the presumption of innocence loosely
speaking.’100 Such a degree of mistrust may be justiﬁed where a
person has been convicted of a serious crime, but arguably ought not
96 G. Maher, ‘Jury Verdicts and the Presumption of Innocence’ (1982) 3 Legal
Studies 146.
97 Scottish Government, Reforming Scots Criminal Law and Practice: Additional
Safeguards Following the Removal of the Requirement for Corroboration (Consulta-
tion Paper 2013). For an analysis and critique see J. Chalmers and F. Leverick,
‘Majority Jury Verdicts’ (2013) 17 Edinburgh Law Review 90.
98 Maher (n 96 above).
99 (2009) 48 EHRR 50 [119].
100 L. Campbell, ‘Criminal Labels, the European Convention on Human Rights
and the Presumption of Innocence’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 681, 687.
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to be a suﬃcient reason for stigmatising a person whose guilt has not
been established by a court.101
IX CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has argued for a broader application of the presumption
of innocence, suggesting that it be treated as a practical attitude
which should be adopted by those engaged in the justice system.
Adoption of this broader, normative approach leads to a reassess-
ment of pre-trial criminal procedure, trial procedure, and some as-
pects of post-trial treatment of acquitted people. It also encourages
both professional and non-professional actors (jurors) to adopt a
questioning attitude towards the evidence, particularly those forms of
potentially problematic evidence which have been associated with
wrongful convictions. The traditional approach in which the pre-
sumption is treated as applicable only to the trial itself leaves those
accused of crime, as well as those who have been tried but acquitted,
in danger of being treated less favourably than other citizens.
Treating the presumption of innocence as a practical attitude reminds
us that those who are accused or suspected of criminality are not to
be equated to those whose guilt has been formally established.
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